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Analyst forecastsDistinct from the literature on the eﬀects that management earnings forecasts
(MEFs) properties, such as point, range and qualitative estimations, have on
analyst forecasts, this study explores the eﬀects of selective disclosure of MEFs.
Under China’s mandatory disclosure system, this study proposes that
managers issue frequent forecasts to take advantage of opportune changes in
predicted earnings. The argument herein is that this selective disclosure of
MEFs increases information asymmetry and uncertainty, negatively inﬂuenc-
ing analyst earnings forecasts. Empirical evidence shows that ﬁrms that issue
more frequent forecasts and make signiﬁcant changes in MEFs are less likely
to attract an analyst following, which can lead to less accurate analyst
forecasts. The results imply that the selective disclosure of MEFs damages
information transmission and market eﬃciency, which can enlighten
regulators seeking to further enhance disclosure policies.
 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong.1. Introduction
Management earnings forecasts (MEFs) of listed companies can reduce information asymmetry and the
cost of capital, improving the eﬃciency of resource allocation in the capital market. Since 2001, regulators
have constantly changed policies to promote and perfect the management forecast system in the Chinese
capital market. A ﬁrm’s management must release earnings forecasts when they anticipate that the ﬁrm’sYat-sen
District,
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134 Y. Wang et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 133–146performance may ﬂuctuate or deviate signiﬁcantly from preliminary expectations. This provides investors with
more timely information and reduces information asymmetry in the capital market. The literature tends to
focus either on the institutional background of voluntary management forecasts or on the alternative MEF
types (e.g., Libby et al., 2006; Wang and Wang, 2012). However, few studies explore the eﬀects of MEFs
on analyst earnings forecasts (AEFs) under a mandatory system. This issue is especially important in China,
as executives may make selective disclosures opportunistically under the mandatory system. The selective dis-
closure of MEFs may not be consistent with the regulation’s original intention, thus whether and how MEFs
are selectively disclosed inﬂuence the behavior of market participants, making them important but rarely
addressed questions. This study ﬁlls this gap by investigating MEFs’ eﬀects on analyst forecasts.
Under the existing mandatory management forecast system, as long as predicted performance reaches the
required threshold, managers must disclose their earnings forecasts. Although the system is mandatory, man-
agers have some selectivity in their choices that allow them to strategically maximize their own beneﬁts before
the actual earnings are disclosed in an annual report, such as selecting a certain management forecast form
(qualitative or quantitative, point or range estimation). Some studies investigate how the types of MEFs aﬀect
the behavior of securities analysts, such as Libby et al. (2006) and Wang and Wang (2012). In contrast, this
study focuses on the important issues of forecast frequency and signiﬁcant changes. A signiﬁcant change in a
forecast is deﬁned as managers making opposite forecasts in multiple MEFs, such as from loss to proﬁt or
from proﬁt to loss. The selective disclosure of MEFs, such as multiple forecasts and signiﬁcant forecast
changes, is common in China’s capital market. For example, the listed ﬁrm “Green Earth” (stock code:
002200) forecast an increase in third-quarter earnings from 20% to 50% in 2009, then further revised the
net proﬁt range for 2009 downward to less than 30% in earnings forecasts made on January 30, 2010. A
net proﬁt for 2009 of 62.12 million yuan was forecast in a preliminary earnings estimate on February 27,
2010, only to be corrected to a loss of 127.96 million yuan on April 28, 2010. However, the earnings in
2009 were reported as a loss of 151.23 million yuan when the annual report was released on April 30,
2010. The company not only disclosed its earnings forecasts many times, but also changed their nature,
prompting a signiﬁcant change in earnings forecasts.
Management earnings forecasts aim to increase decision-related information for investors and reduce infor-
mation asymmetry to reduce the cost of capital. As sophisticated investors, analysts rely on both public and
private information to make earnings forecasts, and thus they are more sensitive to the quality and quantity of
information. If a ﬁrm’s management selectively discloses MEFs, then analysts face greater information risk
and uncertainty, which can result in them issuing less-accurate forecasts. Anecdotal evidence shows that
MEFs are always a strong focus of ﬁnancial analysts as a “prelude” to the annual ﬁnancial statements of listed
companies.1 As a channel of information transmission, MEFs provide more information and hence improve
the quality of prediction for analysts (Libby et al., 2006). However, the error and uncertainty in MEFs may
also aﬀect analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion (Barron et al., 1998; Zhang, 2006). If a ﬁrm’s manage-
ment makes a selective disclosure, such as multiple forecasts or signiﬁcant forecast changes, the quantity
and quality of analysts’ access to public information changes, ultimately aﬀecting their forecast quality. This
study predicts that the selective disclosure of MEFs increases information uncertainty, causing analysts to
change their subsequent decisions and thus reducing their forecast accuracy. The empirical results support this
hypothesis and show that ﬁrms with greater forecast frequency and signiﬁcant forecast changes are less likely
to attract an analyst following and reduce analysts’ forecast accuracy.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it provides direct evidence of how selec-
tively disclosing MEFs aﬀects ﬁnancial analysts’ behavior. Previous studies mainly focus on the ways in which
alternative MEF types inﬂuence analysts’ forecasts. This study extends the research to include the economic
consequences that selectively disclosing MEFs has on analysts’ forecasts. Second, this study provides empirical
evidence of the relationship between information disclosure and analyst behavior under an institutional
background of mandatory MEFs. Unlike some mature capital markets, such as those in the United States,1 Analysts often use the earnings forecasts of listed companies to make forecast revisions and engage in further tracking. An example is
DaYe Special Steel (000708), which published a positive proﬁt alert for 2010 on January 24, 2011, leading Guosen Securities to issue an
analysis report based on the earnings forecast. They stated that the performance of beneﬁcial equipment manufacturing was better than
expected “the next day.” For details: http://stock.hexun.com/2011-01-25/127008640.html.
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provide new empirical evidence of the relationship between MEFs and AEFs. Third, this study has important
policy implications. It shows that the selective disclosure of MEFs, such as multiple forecasts and signiﬁcant
forecast changes, has a negative eﬀect on AEFs. This indirectly aﬀects investors’ behavior and hence the eﬀec-
tiveness of the capital market, further destabilizing the Chinese capital market. If regulators focus only on sys-
tem design and ignore execution eﬃciency, any regulatory eﬀects will be superﬁcial, implying that regulators
should pay more attention to the eﬀective implementation of MEF system, rather than perfecting the policy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and develops the hypoth-
eses. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes
with a summary and a discussion of policy implications.
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development
2.1. Institutional background
The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) oversees the Chinese capital market and delegates
the authority to issue disclosure regulations to the stock exchanges. All Chinese companies end their ﬁscal
years on December 31 and ﬁle quarterly, semiannual and annual ﬁnancial reports with the stock exchanges.
Before 1998, the CSRC did not stipulate a mandatory MEF system. Thus, investors in the capital market
could not obtain comprehensive, timely information. This information asymmetry problem became an
increasing concern for regulators and investors. In 1998, the CSRC enacted the requirement that listed ﬁrms
suﬀering a loss in the previous three years or a large loss must disclose an earnings warning. This was the ﬁrst
time that the CSRC enacted a mandatory management forecast requirement, which was pivotal for China’s
capital market. At the end of 2001, another requirement entitled, “Notice of Eﬀectively Conducting Annual
Report Disclosure Work of the Listed Firm” was implemented by both the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock
Exchanges. This notice required not only ﬁrms with anticipated ﬁscal-year losses, but also those with antici-
pated earnings increases or decreases, to issue mandatory management forecasts. This rule, however, only
required listed ﬁrms to disclose forecasts within 30 calendar days of the end of the ﬁscal year, to increase infor-
mation timeliness, because it is diﬃcult to disentangle such forecasts from earnings preannouncements.2
In 2002, signiﬁcant changes were made in the requirements for MEFs. The CSRC conﬁrmed the basic
principle of “forecasting the next quarterly earnings in this quarterly report,” which meant that listed
companies must make the forecast if a loss or a dramatic earnings increase or decrease was expected.
Moreover, the “Notice of Eﬀectively Conducting Annual Report Disclosure Work of the Listed Firm in
2002” required listed companies to make an immediate supplementary notice when necessary if they did
not disclose a ﬁscal-year loss or a large change in earnings in the third-quarter or temporary reports, or if they
did not report when their actual earnings diﬀered from the forecasted earnings. Fundamentally, these
requirements promote the timeliness of MEFs. More management forecasts are now made by listed ﬁrms
in the ﬁscal year, narrowing the time gap between forecasts. More importantly, pre-forecast rather than post
disclosure not only helps investors to understand earnings changes and make informed decisions, but also
helps regulators to focus on ﬁrms with persistent abnormal accounting earnings changes.
In 2006, the CSRC began to require that listed companies with a loss the previous year and a proﬁt the
present year forecast their earnings. This requirement completed the MEF system. Until 2006, the mandatory
MEF system required all listed ﬁrms to make an earnings forecast in the third-quarter report or a temporary
announcement in the event of a loss, when a loss became a proﬁt or when earnings increased or decreased
more than 50% in one ﬁscal year.
Similar to the literature, this study only focuses on the MEFs of annual earnings, not including semi-annual
earnings. Table 1 lists the changes in the MEF system made by the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges
during 2001–2007.32 An earnings preannouncement is another way of disclosing earnings before the announcement of an annual report.
3 We do not analyze the management forecast system after 2007 because it changed from mandatory to voluntary disclosure. The sample
thus covers the 2001–2007 period.
Table 1
Regulation of management earnings forecasts in China: 2001–2007.
Year Index Requirement Disclosure date Need to disclose in the
last-quarter report
2001 Total proﬁts or earnings
before extraordinary items
Loss or earnings increase or decrease of at
least 50%
Before January 31,
2002
No
2002 Net income or earnings
before extraordinary itemsa
Loss or earnings increase or decrease of at
least 50%
Immediately Yes. In the third-
quarter report
2003 Net income Loss or earnings increase or decrease of at
least 50%
Immediately Yes. In the third-
quarter report
2004 Net income Loss or earnings increase or decrease of at
least 50%
Immediately Yes. In the third-
quarter report
2005 Net income Loss or earnings increase or decrease of at
least 50%
During one month
after ﬁscal year end
Yes. In the third-
quarter report
2006 Net income Loss, change from loss to proﬁt, earnings
increase or decrease of at least 50%
Within one month of
the ﬁscal year end
Yes. In the third-
quarter report
2007 Net income Loss, change form loss to proﬁt, earnings
increase or decrease of at least 50%
Within one month of
the ﬁscal year end
Yes. In the third-
quarter report
a In this year, net income or earnings before extraordinary items is used for the Shanghai Stock Exchange, whereas only net income is
used for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
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First, the system only required ﬁrms to disclose a loss in 2000. Beginning in 2001, ﬁrms with a loss or earnings
increases or decreases of at least 50% were all required to make a disclosure. Beginning in 2006, ﬁrms
sustaining a change from a loss to a proﬁt or vice-versa joined the list of those required to disclose. Hence,
the Chinese MEF system was improved gradually. Second, the indices used in this system have become
increasingly stable and reasonable. Between 2001 and 2002, ﬁrms could choose between net income (and total
proﬁt) and earnings before extraordinary items as the benchmark. After 2002, however, net income was used
exclusively. Such regulation changes can improve the relevance and usefulness of earnings forecast
information, which is the main concern for investors. Third, listed ﬁrms are now required to make more timely
MEF disclosures. Unlike in previous years, the recent regulation requires a ﬁrm’s management to disclose
their earnings forecasts not only within one month of the ﬁscal year end, but also in the third quarter report.
The present-day MEF system provides more timely and unambiguous accounting information to market
participants, thus mitigating the information asymmetry between ﬁrms and investors.2.2. Hypothesis development
Managers can usually decide whether, when and what to disclose to outside investors when maximizing
stockholders’ wealth or their private beneﬁts (Hirst et al., 2008). The literature on voluntary MEF
environments investigates the inﬂuence of management earnings disclosures from an information transmission
perspective. For example, Skinner (1994) ﬁnds that ﬁrms disclose bad news through earnings forecasts to
avoid litigation risk. Kothari et al. (2009) note that managers prefer to disclose good news earlier than bad
news for career consideration reasons. Matsumoto (2002) ﬁnds that managers make earnings forecasts to
decrease analysts’ forecasts and mitigate the market reaction to bad news. Frankel and McNichols (1995)
and Lang and Lundholm (2000) argue that ﬁrms disclose information more frequently and disclose more good
news when they seek re-ﬁnancing from outsiders. These studies show that in a voluntary disclosure
environment, managers have an incentive to inﬂuence investor behavior to achieve speciﬁc goals. Given
management’s rational economic perspective, they often disclose ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial information
selectively or opportunistically to maximize their own beneﬁts rather than those of outside investors.
It can be inferred that China’s mandatory MEF system forces managers to disclose MEFs once the
subsequent predicted annual earnings reach a speciﬁc threshold, but managers can still use their disclosure
behavior, such as alternative forms, forecast frequency or signiﬁcant forecast changes to maximize their
beneﬁts. Because managers have information advantages over outside investors, it is very diﬃcult for the latter
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study investigates two typical MEF disclosure practices in China’s mandatory MEFs system: multiple fore-
casts and signiﬁcant forecast changes. Multiple forecasts are deﬁned by the disclosure numbers of MEFs
for annual earnings and signiﬁcant forecast changes are when managers release opposite earnings forecasts
over at least two forecasts. For example, a manager might predict that the subsequent annual earnings will
increase at least 50% from the previous year in one forecast, and in the next forecast the predicted earnings
are revised to reﬂect at least a 50% decrease. This study investigates these selective MEF practices and their
inﬂuence over analysts’ forecasts.
As sophisticated investors, analysts rely on both public and private information to form their own fore-
casts. Previous studies investigate whether and how public information, such as annual reports, segment
reports and management earnings forecasts, aﬀect analysts’ forecast properties (e.g., Baldwin, 1984;
Hodder et al., 2008; Langberg and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Libby et al., 2006). In the research on MEFs,
early studies consistently ﬁnd that MEFs are associated with statistically signiﬁcant stock price reactions
(e.g., Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Penman, 1980; Waymire, 1984), which strongly suggests that MEFs provide
new information not previously reﬂected in investors’ beliefs about ﬁrms’ earnings prospects. Based on these
ﬁndings, Waymire (1986) further examine the relative accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts prepared both
before and after (prior and posterior forecasts) voluntary MEFs, with the following primary results: (1)
management forecasts are, on average, more accurate than analysts’ forecasts prepared before management
forecasts and (2) analysts’ forecasts prepared after management forecasts are no more accurate than MEFs.
These observed accuracy diﬀerences imply that managers hold inside information upon forecast release. These
studies and ﬁndings on stock price reactions and analyst forecast behavior strongly suggest that MEFs provide
new information related to ﬁrms’ earnings prospects that ﬁnancial analysts then absorb into their decision pro-
cesses. Subsequent studies focus on the alternative MEF types, bias in MEFs and how managerial behavior
inﬂuences analysts’ forecasts. For example, Skinner (1994) and Libby et al. (2006) investigate the eﬀects of
point and range earnings forecasts and ﬁnd that while forecast types do not have an immediate eﬀect after
performance disclosure, once the actual results have been released, the performance forecast form does aﬀect
analysts’ forecasts. Tan et al. (2010) investigate whether and how biased MEFs inﬂuence analysts’ forecasts.
Speciﬁcally, they examine how analysts’ incentives interact with the consistency and magnitude of bias in
management’s guidance when determining the extent to which analysts’ adjust their earnings estimates for
the known bias. Experiments show that analysts do not adjust their forecasts to account for managers’
tendency to provide downwardly-biased guidance, even though they are aware of this tendency (Hun-Tong
et al., 2002), and the ﬁndings are ascribed to analysts’ belief that maintaining a good relationship with
management matters in the post-regulation fair disclosure environment.
Given the aforementioned studies, ﬁnancial analysts rely on MEFs to make their forecasts. Although
MEFs are mandatory in China’s market, management can make other selective choices, such as making multi-
ple forecasts or signiﬁcant forecast changes. This selective disclosure of MEFs exaggerates information uncer-
tainty, making it more diﬃcult for analysts to make informed decisions about processing this public
information. Hence, MEFs signiﬁcantly inﬂuence analysts’ forecasts. Zhang (2006) investigates the relation-
ship between information uncertainty and AEFs and ﬁnds that greater information uncertainty leads to larger
forecast errors. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the selective disclosure of MEFs increases information
uncertainty, negatively aﬀecting AEFs.
In summary, a negative association between the selective disclosure of MEFs and analysts’ forecasts is
expected, and the hypotheses are as follows.
H1. Selective MEFs (forecast frequency and signiﬁcant forecast changes) have a negative eﬀect on AEFs.
This study focuses on the two properties of analysts’ forecasts: analyst following and forecast accuracy;
hence, H1 is divided into the following sub-hypotheses.
H1a. Firms with more frequent forecasts or signiﬁcant forecast changes are less likely to have an analyst
following.
H1b. Firms with more frequent forecasts or signiﬁcant forecast changes exhibit inferior AEF accuracy.
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3.1. Empirical model and variable deﬁnitions
To investigate the eﬀect of MEFs on analysts’ forecasts, analyst following and forecast accuracy are used as
the dependent variables and the following regression models are used to test the hypotheses.Table
Variab
Variab
Depen
NUM
FERR
Indepe
BL
TIME
Contro
LOGT
INS
EV
BIG10
MB
ROE
CORR
UPDANUMi;t ¼ a0 þ a1DLi;t þ a2LOGTAi;t þ a3INSi;t þ a4EV i;t þ a5BIG10i;t þ a6MBi;t þ a7ROEi;t
þ CONTROLi;t þ ei;t ð1Þ
FERRORi;t ¼ a0 þ a1DLi;t þ a2LOGTAi;t þ a3CR1i;t þ a4EV i;t þ a5CORRi;t þ a6UPDATEi;t
þ CONTROLi;t þ ei;t ð2Þwhere FERRORi,t = ABS[Mean(Fnetproi,t)  Netproi,t]/Tvali,t refers to analyst forecast accuracy. This measure
captures the magnitude of the diﬀerence between analyst forecast earnings (Fnetpro) and actual earnings (Net-
pro). NUM is deﬁned as the number of analysts following ﬁrm i in year t. The main variable of interest is DLi,t,
which reﬂects the selective disclosure of MEFs and is divided into two variables: TIMEs and BL. Multiple fore-
casts (or forecast frequency) of MEFs is TIMEs, measured as MEF frequency. A signiﬁcant forecast change is
BL, an indicator that equals 1 if the current MEF is revised to oppose the previous one, and 0 otherwise. Citing
previous studies (e.g., Bai, 2009;Wang andWang, 2012), other factors aﬀecting analysts’ forecasts are controlled
for. LOGTA is ﬁrm size, such that a larger ﬁrm size results in a greater analyst following, more available infor-
mation and lower analyst forecast error. INS is the holding ratio of institutional investors, such that a higher
holding ratio results in better institutional investor supervision of selective disclosure, a higher likelihood of ana-
lyst following and lower analyst forecast error. EV refers to earnings volatility and is calculated as the standard
deviation of earnings during the previous three years, divided by the absolute value of themean of the 3-year earn-
ings. It is predicted that higher earnings volatility will result in a smaller likelihood of analyst following and lower
forecast accuracy.BIG10 refers to auditing quality and is equal to 1 if the auditor is among the 10 largest auditor
ﬁrms according to client assets.MB is ﬁrm growth, calculated as the ratio of market value to book value.ROE is
earnings divided by net equity. CORR refer to the credibility of earnings information, calculated as the correla-
tion coeﬃcient between accounting earnings and annual stock returns. UPDATE refers to the frequency with
which forecasts are updated by brokers, measured as the total number of all analyst reports for ﬁrm i in year
t, divided by the number of brokers following the ﬁrm. All of the variable deﬁnitions are summarized in Table 2.2
le deﬁnitions.
les Deﬁnitions
dent variables
The number of analysts following the ﬁrm
OR Forecast error, which is calculated as the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the means of the predicted and actual
earnings, divided by market value at the previous year’s end
ndent variables
An indicator variable for a signiﬁcant change, coded as 1 if the manager makes diﬀerent earnings forecasts in two adjacent
predictions, and 0 otherwise
S The natural logarithm of the number of MEFs
l variables
A The natural logarithm of total assets
The ratio of institutional shareholdings to total outstanding shares
Earnings volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of net income over the previous three years
The indicator variable for auditor size, coded as 1 if the auditor is one of the largest 10 ﬁrms in the industry according to
client assets, and 0 otherwise
The ratio of the market value of equity to book value
Earnings divided by net equity
The correlation coeﬃcient of stock returns and net income over the previous three years
TE Total number of all analyst reports for ﬁrm i in year t divided by the number of brokers following the ﬁrm
Table 3
Sample selection.
Sample selection process Observations
Management earnings forecasts during 2001–2007 4514
Delete: Forecasts issued after April 30 the following year 3
Earnings forecasts with a non-speciﬁc form 72
B-share listing ﬁrms 377
Firms in the ﬁnancial industry 87
Remaining management earnings forecasts 3975
Merge with sample of analyst forecasts 3975
Final sample after deleting observations with missing values 2613
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The initial sample includes all of the MEFs for annual earnings released by A-share listed companies from
2001 to 2007. First, MEFs issued after April 30 the following year are dropped. Second, ambiguous MEFs are
deleted. Third, ﬁrms issuing only B-stocks are dropped. Finally, ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial industries are excluded.
The remaining sample includes 3975 ﬁrm-year observations. For the analyst forecasts sample, because every
analyst is capable of making multiple forecasts for a ﬁrm in a speciﬁc year, the most recent forecast for each
analyst is kept. Second, the number of analysts following and analyst forecast errors based on ﬁrm year are
calculated. Finally, after merging the MEF and AEF samples and excluding the observations with missing val-
ues for the control variables in the regressions, 2613 ﬁrm-year observations are retained. Table 3 reports the
sample selection procedure. The data on MEFs are from the WIND dataset and AEFs and other ﬁnancial
data are from the CSMAR dataset.
Table 4 lists the yearly distributions of signiﬁcant forecast changes and forecast frequency in Panels A and
B, respectively.4 Panel A shows that the ratio of signiﬁcant forecast changes decreased from 10.12% in 2003 to
5% in 2007. Panel B shows that ﬁrms with one MEF increased from 71.97% in 2003 to 81.75% in 2007. In
contrast, ﬁrms with two MEFs decreased over the period. These results imply that the improvement and
strengthening of the MEF system weakened selective MEF disclosure.4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive analysis
Table 5 shows the summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The mean value of
FERROR is 0.0280, which means that the diﬀerence between the average forecast earnings and actual earnings
accounts for 2.8% of the year-end market value. NUM is the number of analysts following a ﬁrm in a year,
which indicates that on average, every ﬁrm has at least one analyst following it with a maximum of 19
followers. The mean value of BL is 0.078, which means that between 2002 and 2007, about 7% of ﬁrms
changed their earnings forecast dramatically. The mean value of TIMES is 1.27, which means that on average,
each ﬁrm makes at least one earnings forecast.4.2. Univariate tests
Table 6 reports the univariate test results for signiﬁcant forecast changes. Based on the two groups, with
and without signiﬁcant forecast changes, Table 6 shows that ﬁrms with signiﬁcant changes have lower analysts
following (0.4054 vs 1.0733 for mean and 0.000 vs 0.000 for median) and higher forecast errors (0.063 vs4 Table 4 only lists the yearly distributions from 2002 and deletes observations in 2001, which is due to missing analyst following data.
Table 4
Yearly distributions of managers’ selective earnings forecast disclosures.1
Panel A: Yearly distribution of signiﬁcant forecast changes
Year Signiﬁcant forecast changes
No change Change Total
2002 18 1 19
94.74% 5.26%
2003 311 35 346
89.88% 10.12%
2004 425 49 474
89.66% 10.34%
2005 502 33 535
93.83% 6.17%
2006 511 32 543
94.11% 5.89%
2007 661 35 696
94.97% 5.03%
Total 2428 185 2613
92.92% 7.08%
Panel B: Yearly distribution of forecast frequency
Year MEF frequency
1 2 3 4 or more Total
2002 15 4 0 0 19
78.95% 21.05% 0% 0%
2003 249 76 10 11 346
71.97% 21.97% 2.89% 3.17%
2004 344 112 16 2 474
72.57% 23.63% 3.38% 0.42%
2005 423 100 12 0 535
79.07% 18.69% 2.24% 0%
2006 430 107 5 1 543
79.19% 19.71% 0.92% 0.18%
2007 569 117 10 0 696
81.75% 16.81% 1.44% 0%
Total 2030 516 53 4 2613
77.69% 19.75% 2.03% 0.15%
Table 5
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Min Max
NUM 2613 1.0260 0.0000 2.1431 0.0000 19.0000
FERROR 894 0.0280 0.0132 0.0491 0.0001 0.4377
BL 2613 0.0708 0.0000 0.2565 0.0000 1.0000
TIMES 2613 1.2759 1.0000 0.7441 1.0000 16.0000
LOGTA 2613 21.2792 21.1776 1.0556 14.9374 26.8547
INS 2613 13.2102 4.7034 17.8576 0.0001 77.0529
EV 2613 1.8720 0.5375 5.3388 0.0237 62.1303
BIG10 2613 0.2254 0.0000 0.4179 0.0000 1.0000
MB 2613 4.6192 2.7047 8.6874 0.5651 138.0744
ROE 2613 0.0477 0.0492 0.5761 6.2290 2.5275
CORR 2613 1.2822 0.5012 6.2208 40.5558 43.5299
UPDATE 894 1.2057 1.0000 0.4640 0.5000 4.0000
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Table 6
Univariate tests of signiﬁcant forecast changes.
Variables BL Obs. Mean Median T value Z value
NUM Non-signiﬁcant change 2428 1.0733 0.0000 6.15*** 5.5***
Signiﬁcant change 185 0.4054 0.0000
FERROR Non-signiﬁcant change 865 0.0268 0.0130 2.19** 2.14**
Signiﬁcant change 29 0.0630 0.0202
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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between these two groups, thus the univariate tests support our hypotheses.
Table 7 reports the correlation coeﬃcient matrix and shows that TIMES has a signiﬁcant negative
(positive) correlation with NUM (FERROR) at the 1% level. This indicates that a higher MEF frequency is
associated with a smaller analyst following and a higher forecast error. This ﬁnding is consistent with our
hypotheses. Table 7 also shows no notable associations among the other variables.4.3. Multivariate tests
Based on Models (1) and (2), Table 8 reports the multivariate regression results. Consistent with the
univariate analysis, ﬁrms with multiple forecasts and signiﬁcant forecast changes experience a lower analystTable 7
Coeﬃcient correlation matrix.
Variables FERROR NUM BL TIMES LOGTA INS EV BIG10 MB ROE CORR UPDATE
FERROR 0.148*** 0.131*** 0.138*** 0.153*** 0.184*** 0.064* 0.041 0.145*** 0.424*** 0.07** 0.059*
NUM 0.153*** 0.08*** 0.075*** 0.389*** 0.666*** 0.1*** 0.133*** 0.058*** 0.156*** 0.015 0.031
BL 0.072** 0.108*** 0.309*** 0.074*** 0.091*** 0.001 0.031 0.026 0.017 0.01 0.031
TIMES 0.145*** 0.115*** 0.511*** 0.073*** 0.082*** 0.022 0.035* 0.009 0.131*** 0.002 0.023
LOGTA 0.215*** 0.372*** 0.073*** 0.055*** 0.376*** 0.088*** 0.209*** 0.18*** 0.128*** 0.011 0.018
INS 0.15*** 0.608*** 0.116*** 0.098*** 0.353*** 0.124*** 0.15*** 0.081*** 0.196*** 0.053*** 0.083**
EV 0.048 0.268*** 0.03 0.093*** 0.172*** 0.269*** 0.043** 0.009 0.065*** 0.017 0.006
BIG10 0.08** 0.142*** 0.031 0.048** 0.176*** 0.134*** 0.082*** 0.036* 0.021 0.034* 0.033
MB 0.396*** 0.208*** 0.04** 0.007 0.183*** 0.359*** 0.069*** 0.014 0.004 0.027 0.112***
ROE 0.014 0.501*** 0.148*** 0.16*** 0.257*** 0.534*** 0.298*** 0.094*** 0.297*** 0.024 0.037
CORR 0.047 0.073*** 0.016 0.007 0.022 0.146*** 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.09*** 0.135*** 0.002
UPDATE 0.115*** 0.157*** 0.055 0.017 0.032 0.168*** 0.031 0.019 0.175*** 0.108*** 0.01
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 8
Relationship between managers’ earnings forecasts and analyst forecasts.
Variables Number of analysts (NUM) Forecast error (FERROR)
BL TIMES BL TIMES
BL 0.0640* 0.0285***
(1.84) (3.50)
TIMES 0.0772* 0.0307***
(1.79) (3.56)
LOGTA 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.0102*** 0.0101***
(11.69) (11.73) (7.00) (6.95)
Line missing (continued on next page)
Variables Number of analysts (NUM) Forecast error (FERROR)
BL TIMES BL TIMES
INS 0.0228*** 0.0228*** 0.0003*** 0.00036***
(40.65) (40.70) (3.74) (3.51)
EV 0.0034** 0.0034** 0.0003 0.0003
(2.03) (2.00) (0.55) (0.42)
BIG10 0.0181 0.0177 0.0009 0.0010
(0.83) (0.81) (0.28) (0.31)
MB 0.0018* 0.0018* 0.0006 0.0006
(1.71) (1.75) (1.61) (1.56)
ROE 0.0459*** 0.0425*** 0.0779*** 0.0783***
(2.91) (2.68) (13.15) (13.26)
CORR 0.0024* 0.0024* 0.0005** 0.0005**
(1.69) (1.67) (2.12) (2.19)
UPDATE 0.0028 0.0035
(0.91) (1.13)
Ind Contr Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.236*** 2.183*** 0.169*** 0.189***
(10.58) (10.13) (5.21) (5.70)
Observations 2613 2613 894 894
Adj. R2 0.53 0.53 0.25 0.25
Notes: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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NUM at the 10% level (coeﬃcient = 0.064 with t = 1.84) and signiﬁcantly positively related to FERROR
at the 1% level (coeﬃcient = 0.029 with t = 3.50). Meanwhile, the coeﬃcient on TIMES is signiﬁcantly
negatively related to NUM at the 10% level (coeﬃcient = 0.077 with t = 1.79) and signiﬁcantly positively
related to FERROR at the 1% level (coeﬃcient = 0.031 with t = 3.56). Therefore, these results are consistent
with our hypothesis that the selective disclosure of MEFs negatively inﬂuences analysts’ forecasts.4.4. Additional analysis
The results show that the selective disclosure of MEFs increases the uncertainty of information for analysts,
negatively inﬂuencing their forecasts. However, ﬁrms with a higher analyst following or forecast accuracy are
less likely to experience selective MEF disclosure due to the outside governance from analysts. Hence, there is
an endogeneity problem in the analysis. To mitigate this endogeneity issue and enhance the reliability of the
results, a two-step regression based on the determination model is conducted. In the ﬁrst step, the following
model is constructed:DLi;t ¼ a0 þ a1Growthi;t þ a2SOEi;t þ a3ROAi;t þ a4CEOsharei;t þ a5HHIi;t þ a6Sizei;t þ a7DEBT i;t
þ INDi;t þ ei;t ð3Þwhere DL refers to selective MEF disclosure, as measured by BL and TIMES. Growth indicates the
diﬀerence in total assets between the present and previous year. SOE is the ﬁrm’s ownership, and equals 1
if the ultimate controller is the state, and 0 otherwise. ROA is return on total assets, which indicates the ﬁrm’s
proﬁtability. CEOshare is the proportion of shares held by the CEO, which represents insiders’ incentives.
HHI is the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index, calculated as HHI ¼P ðX i=X Þ2, where X ¼
P
X i and Xi is the sales
of ﬁrm i. SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. DEBT is the leverage of the ﬁrm and IND
Table 9
Determinants of management earnings forecasts.
Variables Column (1) Column (2)
BL TIMES
Growth 0.0875 0.0164**
(0.46) (2.05)
SOE 0.0992 0.0028
(0.51) (0.26)
ROA 1.4610* 0.4200***
(1.83) (8.17)
CEOshare 360.0 1.2500
(0.52) (0.86)
HHI 1.5000 0.1400
(0.94) (1.17)
Size 0.3570*** 0.0108**
(3.45) (2.05)
DEBT 0.6660 0.0630**
(1.34) (2.28)
Ind Contr Yes Yes
Constant 4.6070** 1.0690***
(2.11) (9.49)
Observations 2026 2026
Adj. R2 0.04 0.06
Notes: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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ROA and SIZE (DEBT) are (is) negatively (positively) related to BL and TIMES. Likewise, all four coeﬃ-
cients are signiﬁcant in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9, except for Growth and DEBT in Column (1).Table 10
2SLS regression results.
Variables Number of analysts (NUM) Forecast error (FERROR)
BL TIMES BL TIMES
BL 3.3490*** 0.0229
(3.65) (0.22)
TIMES 1.6970*** 0.1400**
(5.35) (2.03)
LOGTA 0.0876*** 0.136*** 0.0099*** 0.0103***
(2.99) (9.22) (4.65) (5.62)
INS 0.0236*** 0.0249*** 0.0003*** 0.0002**
(15.17) (28.37) (3.18) (1.97)
EV 0.0075** 0.0056** 0.0005 0.0004
(2.06) (2.52) (0.81) (0.59)
BIG10 0.0235 0.0246 0.0007 0.0009
(0.44) (0.75) (0.19) (0.22)
MB 0.0019 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004
(0.78) (0.48) (1.00) (0.95)
ROE 0.0673* 0.0114 0.0734*** 0.0703***
(1.95) (0.46) (9.99) (10.67)
CORR 0.0034 0.0023 0.0005* 0.0005
(0.81) (0.88) (1.74) (1.45)
Line missing (continued on next page)
Variables Number of analysts (NUM) Forecast error (FERROR)
BL TIMES BL TIMES
UPDATE 0.0025 0.0038
(0.71) (0.99)
Ind Contr Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.3920** 1.2540*** 0.1660*** 0.2860***
(2.01) (2.68) (3.18) (3.81)
Observations 2026 2026 676 676
Adj. R2 0.15 0.39 0.30 0.13
Notes: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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results are shown in Table 10, which shows that all of the results are consistent with our hypothesis, except
that the coeﬃcient of BL is no longer signiﬁcant in the FERROR model.
4.5. Robustness tests
In addition to the main tests above, several robustness tests were conducted. First, the omitted variable
problem is eliminated by controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression model. The results are shown inTable 11
Robustness test (1): Fixed eﬀects model.
Variables Number of analysts (NUM) Forecast error (FERROR)
BL TIMES BL TIMES
BL 0.0343 0.0312**
(0.88) (2.23)
TIMES 0.0570 0.0336**
(1.17) (2.24)
LOGTA 0.3210*** 0.3180*** 0.0059 0.0051
(9.26) (9.17) (0.80) (0.70)
INS 0.0158*** 0.0158*** 0.0001 0.0001
(16.45) (16.49) (0.66) (0.73)
EV 0.0022 0.0021 0.0004 0.0003
(1.16) (1.11) (0.52) (0.32)
BIG10 0.0346 0.0353 0.0014 0.0000
(0.89) (0.91) (0.18) (0.002)
MB 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 0.0005 0.0005
(3.08) (3.08) (0.64) (0.67)
ROE 0.0020 0.0044 0.0699*** 0.0692***
(0.11) (0.25) (5.20) (5.14)
CORR 0.0037* 0.0037* 0.0002 0.0002
(1.80) (1.82) (0.45) (0.43)
UPDATE 0.0077 0.0072
(1.40) (1.29)
Constant 6.6390*** 6.5450*** 0.1760 0.1350
(9.08) (8.89) (1.13) (0.85)
Observations 2613 2613 894 894
Adj. R2 0.23 0.23 1.61 1.61
Notes: t-valued are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 12
Robustness tests (2): Analyst forecast behavior after management earnings forecasts.
Variables Number of analysts (NUM) Forecast error (FERROR)
BL TIMES BL TIMES
BL 0.1120*** 0.4210
(3.34) (1.31)
TIMES 0.2070*** 0.6930**
(5.00) (2.46)
LOGTA 0.0917*** 0.0916*** 0.0466 0.0404
(9.91) (9.93) (1.26) (1.09)
INS 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 0.0014 0.0011
(28.42) (28.48) (0.70) (0.52)
EV 0.0010 0.0009 0.0127 0.0130
(0.61) (0.54) (0.96) (0.98)
BIG10 0.0158 0.0172 0.0369 0.0157
(0.75) (0.82) (0.43) (0.19)
MB 0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0005 0.0005
(1.99) (2.04) (0.05) (0.05)
ROE 0.0401*** 0.0312** 0.7150*** 0.6560**
(2.65) (2.05) (2.60) (2.39)
CORR 0.0033** 0.0032** 0.0020 0.0024
(2.38) (2.33) (0.37) (0.43)
UPDATE 0.0052 0.0375
(0.05) (0.37)
Ind Contr Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.8170*** 1.6500*** 0.7420 1.2810
(8.94) (7.99) (0.88) (1.48)
Observations 2613 2613 512 512
Adj. R2 0.37 0.37 0.11 0.12
Notes: t-values are reported in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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longer signiﬁcant in the analyst following model.
Second, the results may also be caused by simultaneity. Two methods are used to solve this problem. First,
only analyst forecasts that were issued after MEFs disclosure are kept. This requirement reduces the ﬁnal
sample from 894 to 512. The results based on this sample (observations = 512) are shown in Table 12 and
are similar to those in Table 8. Second, BL and TIMES last year are used as the main explanatory variables
and the untabulated results are also similar to those in Table 8.
Finally, the results may be driven by ﬁrm complexity.5 To control for this eﬀect, several variables are
selected to proxy for ﬁrm complexity, including intangible assets, accounts receivable, inventory and the
sum of accounts receivable and inventory. The full sample is then divided into sub-samples to examine
whether the results are consistent. The untabulated results show that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two sub-samples, indicating that the ﬁndings are not driven by ﬁrm complexity.5. Conclusion
This study examines the association between selective MEF disclosure and analysts’ forecasts under
China’s mandatory MEF system. Two types of selective MEF disclosure and their eﬀects on analysts’ follow-
ing and forecast accuracy are examined: forecast frequency and signiﬁcant forecast changes. The empirical5 We thank the referee for this suggestion.
146 Y. Wang et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 133–146results show that such selective disclosure negatively inﬂuences analysts’ forecasts and reduces analyst follow-
ing and forecast accuracy. These results imply that in addition to MEF type, how and how frequently
managers disclose MEFs also inﬂuence analysts’ forecasts in mandatory MEF system, such as the one in
China.
This study makes several important potential contributions to the literature and practice. First, MEFs are
one of most important information sources for analysts’ forecasts. This study examines the eﬀect of manage-
rial disclosure behavior on AEFs from an information uncertainty perspective. It also contributes to the
literature on information disclosure quality (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Bai, 2009; Langberg and
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). Second, this study provides more empirical evidence illustrating the relationship
between information uncertainty and analysts’ behavior (Zhang, 2006). Third, this study’s results have
important policy implications. The empirical evidence shows that selective MEF disclosure negatively
inﬂuences analysts’ forecasts. Meanwhile, ﬁnancial analysts are an important intermediary and they play a
main role in mitigating the information asymmetry in the capital market. Thus, more resources should be
devoted by regulators to supervise MEF disclosure in an eﬀort to improve market eﬃciency.
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